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COMMENTS
IN THE WAKE OF THE PIPELINE EMBARGO:
EUROPEAN-UNITED STATES DIALOGUE
SARAH J. COGSWELL
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 1982, President Reagan extended controls restricting
the export to the Soviet Union of oil and gas equipment manufac-
tured in the United States or by licensees or subsidiaries of United
States companies.' The President's action caused a major crisis in
relations between the United States and its Western European al-
lies. The crisis brought into sharp focus the differences between
the United States and its allies in attitudes toward East-West rela-
tions. The export controls (the so-called "pipeline embargo") were
imposed under authority of the Export Administration Act (EAA)
of 1979.2 The Act gives the President power to control exports for
foreign policy reasons. Although the legality of the President's ac-
tion was challenged at home and abroad, the lifting of the sanc-
tions in November of 1982 curtailed any attempt to resolve the le-
gal question by action in the courts.3
The EAA of 1979 expired on September 30, 1983." Coming on
the heels of the oil and gas equipment embargo, the necessity for
renewal of the Act sparked heated debate within the United States
and abroad. Discussions within the United States focused largely
on the political and economic effects of the embargo and the wis-
dom or unwisdom of giving the President unrestrained discretion
in the imposition of controls.' International debates centered on
1. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
2. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-
2420 (Supp. III 1979)).
3. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
4. However, the EAA has been extended into the future, and will continue to be ex-
tended until a new bill is passed. At the time of printing, the House bill, H.R. 3231, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), awaits action in the Senate; and the Senate bill, S. 927, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983), is in conference committee.
5. This discussion raises two important issues recurring in United States political de-
bates: the effectiveness of presidential embargoes, and the constitutional balance between
the executive and legislative branches in the area of foreign trade. For a thorough discussion
of the former issue, see Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals: Foreign Policy Export
Controls in the 1970s and 1980s, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1981). On the latter point, see the
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legal questions and international comity, although analysis of eco-
nomic cost-effectiveness formed a strong basis for the protest. Eu-
ropean countries objected vehemently to President Reagan's at-
tempt to apply the controls extraterritorially, to extend the
sanctions not only to the reexport of United States products and
technology, but also to non-United States products exported by
overseas subsidiaries and licensees of United States companies.
The objections were also directed at the extension of controls to
interrupt contracts already in force.
This comment traces the international debate from the imposi-
tion of controls to the proposals for revision of the EAA in 1983-84.
Beginning with a discussion of the 1979 EAA provisions, the com-
ment examines President Reagan's use of the EAA in the pipeline
embargo, the European protest and accusations of illegality, the
concern over the extension of the EAA, and the American response
to domestic and international pressures in presidential and con-
gressional proposals for the EAA amendments.
II. THE EAA oF 1979
The Export Administration Act of 1979 was an amended version
of a law passed shortly after World War II.0 The original purpose
of the postwar law was to give the President certain powers over
the control of exports in the interest of national security. The orig-
inal law was passed at a time when American foreign policy, facing
the reality of a Europe divided between East and West, was over-
shadowed by a growing fear of Soviet power and influence. Ini-
tially, the President was granted full discretion in deciding when to
impose controls.
In 1979, the EAA was divided into two main parts. The foreign
policy control provisions for the first time were separated from the
excellent analysis by J.H. Jackson in United States-EEC Trade Relations: Constitutional
Problems of Economic Interdependence, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 453 (1979). See also
Jackson, Louis, & Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing
International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267 (1982) for a discussion of constitu-
tional constraints in the context of trade negotiation and implementation of trade
agreements.
6. For a brief history of the EAA, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CON-
GRESS, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE: AN UPDATE 17 (May 1983) [hereinafter cited as
OTA REPORT]; see also Berman, The Export Administration Act International Aspects, 74
Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 82 (1980). The first continuous peacetime export control author-
ized by Congress was the Export Control Act of 1949. This act was superseded by the Ex-
port Administration Act of 1969, which in turn was replaced by the Export Administration
Act of 1979.
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provisions safeguarding national security. 7 Section 6 of the EAA,
the foreign policy provision, contained several restrictions on the
executive power.8 Among these was a set of criteria to be used by
the President in considering whether to impose trade restrictions.
Also included was a requirement that the President justify to Con-
gress the imposition of restrictions in any particular circumstance.
The criteria, which played a central role in the pipeline contro-
versy, covered a wide range of concerns and were specified in the
act as follows:
(b) Criteria-When imposing, expanding, or extending export
controls under this section, the President shall consider-
(1) the probability that such controls will achieve the in-
tended foreign policy purpose . . .;
(2) the compatibility of the proposed controls with the
foreign policy objectives of the United States . . .;
(3) the reaction of other countries to the imposition or
expansion of such export controls by the United States;
(4) the likely effects of the proposed controls on the ex-
port performance . . . the competitive position . . . the in-
ternational reputation of the United States as a supplier of
goods and technology, and on individual United States com-
panies . .. ;
(5) the ability of the United States to enforce the pro-
posed controls effectively; and
(6) the foreign policy consequences of not imposing
controls.'
Further procedures were also specified. The Secretary of Com-
merce was required to consult with industries which might be af-
fected "as the Secretary considers appropriate." The President was
also required to seek alternative means of achieving the foreign
policy objective. As for consultation with Congress, the President
"in every possible instance" was to consult Congress before sanc-
tions were imposed, and otherwise had to notify Congress immedi-
ately afterwards. Moreover, the President was required to submit a
report to Congress discussing his consideration of the criteria, his
attempt to use alternative means or why none were available, and
his evaluation of how the sanctions would further United States
interests and international obligations. The President was also re-
7. OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 18.
8. 50 U.S.C. § 2405 (Supp. III 1979).
9. Id. § 2405(b).
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quired to take "all feasible steps" to negotiate with other countries
and gain international support for the -control measures. 10
These rather weak provisions were viewed as at least some curb
on formerly unrestrained presidential discretion in the imposition
of export controls.1" Nevertheless, the President was granted a
broad range of authority. The empowering clause of the Act read
as follows:
The President may prohibit or curtail the exportation of any
goods, technology, or other information subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States or exported by any person subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, to the extent necessary to
further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to
fulfill its declared international obligations. 2
The key words in this clause are "subject to the jurisdiction of."
The extent of the United States' jurisdiction beyond its territorial
borders was the central dispute of much of the subsequent debate.
Note that the clause includes goods, technology, information, and
persons "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
It seems clear that Congress intended the EAA of 1979 to have
extraterritorial application." Congressional discussion before pas-
sage of the bill and the intentional use of the phrase "any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" in defining the
limit of presidential powers demonstrate that Congress intended
the President to have the power to control the United States' in-
terests beyond the United States' territorial borders. 4 The EAA
defines "United States person"" as (1) a resident or national, (2) a
domestic concern (including any permanent domestic establish-
ment of any foreign concern), and (3) any foreign subsidiary or af-
filiate (including any permanent foreign establishment) controlled
in fact by a domestic concern.16 Thus, when President Reagan ex-
10. Id. § 2405(c)-(e), (g).
11. Berman, supra note 6, at 83.
12. 50 U.S.C. § 2405(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
13. For a clear and convincing argument that Congress intended the EAA to have extra-
territorial application, see Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 Under International and American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1308 (1983).
14. Id. at 1313-14.
15. 50 U.S.C. § 2415(2) (Supp. III 1979).
16. A certain contradiction appears on the face of the statute in defining a United States
person to include foreign concerns established in the United States while, at the same time,
including United States concerns established in another country. This contradictory asser-
tion of the United States' jurisdiction was pointed out by the Europeans in their response to
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tended the embargo on equipment bound for use on the Soviet Si-
berian pipeline to include United States subsidiaries and licensees
abroad, he was fully within the powers delegated to him by Con-
gress as he understood them and, arguably, as Congress had
intended.
III. THE PIPELINE SANCTIONS
On December 30, 1981, President Reagan imposed certain con-
trols on oil and gas equipment and technology bound for use on
the Siberian pipeline.1 7 These controls required a validated license
for the export from the United States or the reexport from another
country of products or technology of United States origin. Since
validated licenses were not being issued by the Department of
Commerce, this regulation amounted to an embargo. In practical
terms, under these regulations a company in Britain, Italy, France,
or West Germany could not, for example, export a gas turbine to
be used in the Soviet Union if the gas turbine contained rotors and
blades made by General Electric.18 This type of reexport control is
used fairly frequently by the United States in an attempt to pre-
vent certain United States-origin materials from reaching the So-
viet Union. l"
The extension of the controls appeared to come, at least in part,
in reaction to a lack of agreement among the allies on the appro-
priate sanctions to be levied against the Soviet Union. In June
1982, at the close of the summit at Versailles, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) countries signed a joint declaration
of policy regarding East-West trade.2 Soon thereafter, a disagree-
ment arose over the effect of the declaration:
[French] President Mitterrand denied that the declaration would
affect France's credit policy vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. This action ef-
fectively eliminated any impression of a unified Western commer-
cial policy on East-West trade. The fact that the U.S. administra-
tion had publicly heralded the statement as just such a
development made Mitterrand's announcement all the more
the sanctions. See infra notes 30-47 and accompanying text.
17. See the regulations reproduced in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 864 (1982), as reprinted
from 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250-52 (1982). The controls were imposed as a reaction to the declara-
tion of martial law in Poland. OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
18. OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 31.
19. See, e.g., Note, supra note 13, at 1314 n.38.
20. OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 64.
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disturbing. 21
On June 18, 1982, President Reagan extended the pipeline sanc-
tions to include goods or technology exported by United States
subsidiaries and licensees abroad even if they were not of United
States origin.2" The regulation again specified the definition of
"person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"2s as:
(i) Any person, wherever located, who is a citizen or resident of
the United States;
(ii) Any person actually within the United States;
(iii) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United
States or of any state, territory, possession, or district of the United
States; or
(iv) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organiza-
tion, wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or con-
trolled by persons specified in paragraphs (i), (ii), or (iii) of this
section.2"
The wide sweep of the sanctions was emphasized by the inclu-
sion of all companies subject to a licensing agreement or payment
of royalties or other compensation to a person subject to United
States jurisdiction.2 5 The sanctions included all foreign companies
importing American goods and owing payment to American corpo-
rations. In addition to this broad claim of United States jurisdic-
tion, the controls were made retroactive. That is, the controls were
applied to contracts already entered into and in process, and not
only to those subject to future validated licenses. This retroactivity
meant that companies were forbidden to honor binding contracts
with the Soviet Union, even though production of equipment had
begun and the company would have to pay damages to the Soviet
Union for failure to deliver.26
21. Id. at 64-65.
22. 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 864 (1982).
23. 50 U.S.C. § 2405(a)(1) (Supp. I1. 1979).
24. 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 866. Note again the apparent contradictory assertions
of jurisdiction in categories (iii) and (iv). Moreover, under (ii) a French national owner of a
French corporation, for example, on vacation in the United States would be subject to the
regulations, as would the corporation under category (iv). This tenuous assertion is but-
tressed by the claim to jurisdiction over any company receiving American goods, or owing
Americans money, a category which would seem to include most European international
trading companies.
25. Id. at 864.
26. The effects of these provisions on particular companies is discussed further below.
See sources cited infra note 108.
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Thus, under the June 1982 extensions, the President was at-
tempting to block the export of goods by United States subsidiar-
ies, incorporated under the laws of other countries, and by Euro-
pean companies who held licenses from United States companies
for the production of certain components of gas and pipeline
equipment, and of goods and technology purchased from the
United States regardless of location or ownership. The sanctions
for violation of the President's order were severe and included
both criminal and civil sanctions.2 As the most effective sanction,
the President could ban all trade between the United States and a
foreign violator.2 8
The reaction from Europe was swift and strong. Britain and
France ordered their companies to ignore President Reagan's order
and threat of sanctions and to continue production and shipment
of pipeline equipment.2 9 The European Economic Community
(EEC) sent a formal protest to the President, enumerating the
grievances of its member countries in legal and diplomatic terms.30
European editorials decried the attempt at extraterritorial control,
thus adding to the list of laws and generally accepted principles of
international relations violated by the unilateral American action."'
The arguments grounded in law and principle will be explored in
the next section. The dilemma faced by the corporations will be
taken up in a later section.
IV. EUROPEAN PROTEST
In a memorandum sent to President Reagan in August of 1982,
the Commission of the EEC outlined its political and legal argu-
ment against the extension of the pipeline embargo.32 Of the per-
sons and goods affected by the restrictions, the EEC objected to
the inclusion of three categories: (1) export of certain equipment of
United States origin by any person within a third country; (2) ex-
port of goods and technology of non-United States origin by any
"person subject to United States jurisdiction;" (3) export by any
27. See OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 43. See also generally 50 U.S.C. § 2410 (Supp. III
1979).
28. OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 31.
29. See Between Reagan and a hard place, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 1982, at 55; see also
Europe drives a hole through those American sanctions, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 1982, at 47.
30. EEC memo, reprinted in European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regula-
tions Concerning Trade with the U.S.S.R., 21 INrT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 891 (1982).
31. See, e.g., Editorial Comments, Does Mr. Reagan's writ run in Europe?, 19 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 497 (1982); see also Pipelines Asunder, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 1982, at 13.
32. EEC memo, supra note 30.
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person of products derived from United States technology or pro-
duced in "plants based on such U.S. technical data."33 In addition,
the EEC protested that the regulations encouraged others not cov-
ered by these restrictions to voluntarily submit to the controls.34
The EEC based its objections to the extraterritorial provisions on
both international and United States domestic law.
A. International Principles
In arguing the United States had no jurisdiction to prescribe
controls to the three categories of persons and goods outlined
above, the Commission cited two principles generally accepted in-
ternationally as bases for jurisdiction.3 5 The "territoriality princi-
ple," which recognizes a nation's jurisdiction over the territory
within its boundaries, was obviously not applicable to the extrater-
ritorial application at issue. The "nationality principle" was a more
plausible basis as applied to two aspects of the regulations: the at-
tempt to control United States subsidiaries and licensees, and the
assertion of jurisdiction over United States goods and technology.
In the case of corporations, whether subsidiaries or licensees, the
"generally accepted" criteria for determination of nationality were
said to be the state of incorporation and the place of the registered
office. The EEC memorandum cited a case from the International
Court of Justice which declared these criteria to be "confirmed by
long practice and by numerous international instruments." "The
Court also scrutinized other tests of corporate nationality, but con-
cluded that these had not found general acceptance. 37 Since the
companies at issue were incorporated and registered in Europe, the
United States' claim of jurisdiction on the basis of corporate na-
tionality was without merit. The idea that commodities and tech-
nology can have a nationality was dismissed as well. "[T]here are
no known rules under international law for using goods or technol-
ogy situated abroad as a basis of establishing jurisdiction over the
persons controlling them."38 In support of this proposition, the
Commission cited cases from Hong Kong and Antwerp disallowing
United States jurisdiction over goods of United States origin that
33. Id. at 891-92.
34. Id. at 895.
35. Id. at 893.
36. Id. at 894. (The case cited is the Barcelona Traction case, reported in 1970 I.C.J. 3,
43.)
37. EEC memo, supra note 30, at 894.
38. Id.
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were in another country. 9
The memorandum went on to discuss and reject two further pos-
sible bases for assertion of jurisdiction. The first basis was the
"protective principle" which may be used only when national se-
curity is at stake, which was not claimed by the Reagan adminis-
tration. The second basis was the "effects doctrine" which may be
used when actions abroad are perceived to have "direct, foresee-
able and substantial effects" in the form of a crime or tort within
the territory of the state asserting jurisdiction.4" The memorandum
asserted that this basis of jurisdiction could not "conceivably be
argued" in this case."'
Under United States law, the EEC Commission pointed out that
a similar effort by a foreign country to control United States com-
panies would not be honored in the United States, and companies
honoring a foreign boycott might be subject to United States sanc-
tions. The paper cited the anti-foreign boycott provisions of the
EAA which forbid any United States company to support a boy-
cott by a foreign country against a country friendly to the United
States. Any company violating these provisions would be subject to
prosecution and sanctioning."2
Furthermore, in the case of a conflict of enforcement jurisdiction
between nations, United States courts usually endeavor to balance
the interests of the conflicting nations and the entities to be con-
trolled. Several factors are considered by the courts: nationality of
the entity, place of business of the corporations, feasibility of en-
forcement, relative effects on the entity, harm to American com-
merce, and the location of the proscribed conduct. These factors
were cited as similar to those in section 40 of the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law which also includes "the extent
and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement ac-
tions would impose upon the person."'" The Commission pointed
out that the third draft of the Restatement contains similar crite-
39. Id. at 894 n.2. But see Note, supra note 13, at 1314 n.38. (The author points out that
the United States has a long history of attempting to control exported goods. Although the
control is usually contained in agreements on reexporting signed before the goods leave the
United States, "this fact alone is not dispositive.")
40. EEC memo, supra note 30, at 896. For a discussion of extraterritoriality through the
use of the effects doctrine in the areas of antitrust, securities, federal criminal law, and
products liability, see Feinberg, Economic Coercion And Economic Sanctions: The Expan-
sion Of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 323 (1981).
41. EEC memo, supra note 30, at 896-97.
42. 50 U.S.C. § 2407 (Supp. III. 1979).
43. EEC memo, supra note 30, at 899.
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ria. The memorandum suggested that the administration should
have applied these criteria in making its foreign policy control
decisions.""
B. United States Law
The EEC Commission also pointed out in its memorandum that
the procedures to be followed by the President as required by sec-
tion 6 of the EAA indicate the President's action was contrary to
United States law. Particularly, the memorandum alleged that the
requirements concerning consideration of the reaction of other
countries, pursuance of alternative means, and assurance of coop-
eration from other countries were not satisfied by the President
before imposing the controls." In addition, the paper stated that,
in light of clear indications that the Soviet Union intended and
was able to complete the pipeline without United States equip-
ment, criterion 1 of section 6(b), requiring that the purpose of the
sanctions be achievable, was' not satisfied. Criteria 3, requiring for-
eign state reaction be taken into account, and 4, requiring consid-
eration of the effects of the controls on United States export per-
formance, were also inadequately assessed."'
Finally, the EEC turned to the United States law concerning
taking without compensation. 47 It argued that the sanctions im-
posed by the government would have serious consequences on the
companies affected, forcing layoffs and perhaps bankruptcy and
forfeiture of contracts. These consequences would be the practical
equivalent of confiscation, and the taking of property by the gov-
ernment without compensation, which is against United States
law.
C. Analysis
The arguments of the EEC in regard to international and do-
mestic United States law have a good deal of force. The arguments
of international law seem especially convincing since they are con-
gruent with the interpretation of international law as applied by
the United States courts. The decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano4" was
44. Id. at 900.
45. Id. at 900-01.
46. Id. at 901-02.
47. See discussion in EEC memo, supra note 30, at 902.
48. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
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handed down in June of 1982, the same month in which the con-
trols were extended. In that case, the Court held that a wholly
owned subsidiary of a Japanese firm, incorporated in the United
States, was a United States citizen and subject to United States
domestic law. The Court found that the place-of-incorporation rule
(and not the "control test") was agreed to by both the Japanese
and United States' governments and that the use of the rule was
"consistent with prior treaty practice. 4 9 In addition, the Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law50 establishes, in section 216, the na-
tionality of a corporation as that of "the state that creates it," that
is, the place of incorporation. Section 418, entitled "Jurisdiction to
Control Foreign -Subsidiaries of U.S. Corporations," provides that
the United States may apply its law to subsidiaries organized
under the laws of a foreign state if it is "substantially owned or
controlled by nationals of the United States.""1 This provision,
however, is subject to two caveats which are important here: (1)
the United States may not exercise this jurisdiction "to require
conduct that is prohibited, or to prohibit conduct that is required,
in the state where the branch or corporation is organized or is do-
ing business";52 and (2) the entire section 418 is subject to section
403, which prohibits the United States from applying its law
abroad when it is "unreasonable." "Unreasonable" is defined by
the consideration of eight factors,53 which are very similar to the
"balance of interest" factors quoted in the EEC memorandum.
Thus the Restatement and recent case law support the Commis-
sion's proposition that, under generally accepted international law,
the United States subsidiaries incorporated in foreign states would
not properly be subject to United States jurisdiction, especially
when there is conflict with the laws of the incorporating state."
The argument from the standpoint of domestic law is less clear,
except as to the requirements within the EAA itself. Although the
regulations state that the administration had considered the crite-
ria and completed the required process,55 Congressional leaders, as
well as the EEC Commission, felt that the consideration given was
49. 457 U.S. at 183, 185 n.11.
50. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrED STATES (REVISED) (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1981).
51. Id. § 418(2).
52. Id. § 418(4)(a).
53. Id. § 403(2).
54. For a discussion of Congress' vacillation in the application of laws extraterritorially,
see Feinberg, supra note 40, at 336.
55. EEC memo, supra note 30, at 864.
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inadequate, and that the President had not fulfilled the require-
ments of the Act." In addition, the foreign boycotts section 57 of
the Act makes it clear that the United States legal system will not
enforce a boycott imposed by a foreign state with which the United
States did not agree. The President's action therefore appears to
have lacked adequate foundation under the EAA and to have re-
sulted in an inequitable application of United States law.
V. UNITED STATES RESPONSE
A. The Administration
The reaction of the State Department to the general interna-
tional uproar, and the protest inside the United States, was re-
flected in a speech given before the American Society of Interna-
tional Law by Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State.8 The
speech indicated that although the government recognized the
problem, and perhaps tacitly admitted questionable legality under
international law, 9 the State Department took the position that
"administration after administration and Congress after Congress"
had asserted jurisdiction over American subsidiaries and licensees
"when substantial American interests" were at stake.60 Dam indi-
cated that the government viewed the problem as one of conflicting
foreign policies with a diplomatic, and not a legal, solution. In this
vein, Mr. Dam listed measures the government was prepared to
take to avoid future disputes." The measures bearing on export
controls included harmonization of foreign policies through con-
56. H.R. REP. No. 257, part 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983). The report from the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Export Administration Amendments Act of
1983 states:
[T]he committee finds that the executive branch process for deciding to employ
controls has been deficient. The executive branch has generally failed to consult
with other countries. . . . The Congress has generally not been consulted prior to
the imposition of control, but merely has been notified after the controls were
imposed.
57. 50 U.S.C. § 2407 (Supp. III 1979).
58. Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BULLE-
TIN, June 1983, at 48.
59. This admission seems evident from the overall tone of the speech and the proposi-
tion that the basic problem was conflict in policy and that, once the policy dispute was
solved, the legal problems became less significant. The administration took the position that
the issue was primarily diplomatic. Id. at 50-51.
60. Id. at 50. But see EEC memo, supra note 30, at 903. The memo discusses several
recent instances of United States controls which were not applied extraterritorially or
retroactively.
61. Dam, supra note 58, at 51.
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sensus within the Western alliance, more consultation and cooper-
ation with foreign governments when the possibility of conflict
arises, and new efforts not to interfere with existing contractual
obligations. However, the government did not fully accept the
"balancing of competing state interests" test urged by the EEC
memorandum and included in the third draft of the Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law. Presumably, this test would require giv-
ing somewhat equivalent weight to the interests of a foreign coun-
try and the interests of the United States, a proposition not wholly
compatible with the position of the State Department. In light of
the provisions for consultation with foreign governments already in
the EAA of 1979, the traditional view of the importance of honor-
ing contracts,62 and the continuing diplomatic efforts on both sides
of the Atlantic to encourage mutual understanding and consensus
in relation to the Eastern bloc, the measures outlined by Mr. Dam
are not likely to impress the European governments or the critics
within the United States.
Mr. Dam also summarized the administration's proposals for the
1983 amendments to the EAA.6 3 A new statement of policy empha-
sizes a commitment "to minimize the impact on preexisting con-
tracts and on business activities in allied or other friendly coun-
tries," qualified by the phrase, "to the extent consistent with the
underlying purpose of the controls." More precisely, the proposals
include an exemption for any contract in force at the time of impo-
sition of the controls which requires delivery within 270 days of the
date of the sanction. This exemption is in effect already for agri-
cultural contracts." The exemption is qualified by an exception if
the President determines that immediate interruption of contracts
is necessitated by an "overriding national interest."6 5 In the na-
tional security provisions of the Act, the administration's bill
would allow the government to restrict the imports from foreign
corporations that are not complying with United States national
security controls.
62. This is also the view of many within the administration as indicated by Secretary of
State Schultz's comment when he was the president of Bechtel Group, Inc.: "[M]ajor com-
mercial relationships [overseas] cannot be turned on and off like a light switch." Wash.
Post, Jan. 15, 1983, at A2, col. 1.
63. Dam, supra note 58, at 51.
64. Id. The 270-day provision for agricultural products was part of the Futures Trading
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 238, 96 Stat. 2294, 2326 (1983). See explanation in OTA
REPORT, supra note 6, at 44.
65. Dam, supra note 58, at 51.
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A detailed analysis of the President's 1983 proposals6 for the
EAA indicates that only two substantive changes were made to
section 6, the foreign policy control section. 7 A new subsection
added the qualified 270-day exemption for existing contracts indi-
cated by Mr. Dam. This provision and an exemption for "dona-
tions of articles . . . used to relieve human suffering"' 8 are the only
significant changes made in this section. The major focus of the
President's proposals was on the national security provisions of the
Act. Changes to the "Findings" and "Declaration of Policy" sec-
tions 9 indicate a new emphasis on the control of the reexport of
United States goods from foreign countries to the Soviet Union
and on persuading other countries to limit exports of goods and
technology comparable to those the United States is seeking to
control. Reworking the list of controlled goods, loosening the for-
eign availability criterion, and adding the import sanctions as pro-
posed by the President would toughen the national security provi-
sions of the Act.
The President's proposals thus show little accomodation to the
charges of illegality. They do, however, give qualified protection for
a limited group of contracts. On the other hand, they would allow
the Presidentfmore discretion in evaluating foreign availability and
grant him a new power to block imports.
Once again the EEC lodged a formal protest with the State De-
partment.70 The memorandum, delivered just before the Williams-
burg summit in May 1983, used "unusually strong language" in ob-
jecting to the President's bill. Approved by the Council of
Ministers, the highest level of government in the EEC, the docu-
ment was personally delivered to Richard T. McCormack, Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, by the
EEC Head of Delegation in Washington and to the German Am-
bassador." The memorandum adhered to the legal arguments set
forth in the earlier memorandum and added arguments pertaining
to comity and diplomacy. Referring to the EAA proposals, the doc-
ument unequivocably stated:
66. COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A
DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION To AMEND AND REAUTHORIZE THE EXPORT ADMINISTRA-
TION ACT OF 1979, H.R. Doc. No. 40, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id. at 13.
69. Id. at 3-6.
70. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1983, at Al, col. 5.
71. Id. See also Morris, E.T. go home, EUROPE, July-Aug. 1983, at 22.
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It is not justifiable nor acceptable that Section 6 of the Export
Administration Act be used to impose U.S. law and policy on
other friendly countries which will have their own policy views
and will wish to take their own decisions on what restrictions, if
any, can be imposed on trade with third countries. 2
The letter warned that the pipeline controversy has shown that
"considerable political disruption and commercial damage can en-
sue" in disputes over export controls. "The correct course. . . is to
seek a consensus with . . . trading partners on the trade controls
to be adopted and not to try to extend controls unilater-
ally. . .. ,,7- The EEC also intimated that the President's proposed
import restrictions might be contrary to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).74
Making little headway with the President's proposals, some Eu-
ropean organizations began to take active steps toward persuading
Congress. The British Government, in an unusual lobbying effort,
called on the Senate75 to strike a provision of an East-West trade
bill that would extend the reach of the United States' laws to for-
eign countries. 76 There were also hints that the Europeans might
feel compelled to pass retaliatory legislation if no changes were
made.77
B. The Congress
1. OTA Report
Congress proved more responsive to the international objections,
although undoubtedly pressures from domestic sources played a
large part in the proposed reformations of the foreign policy provi-
sions of the EAA. In May of 1983, the Office of Technological As-
sessment (OTA) published a report for Congress on the impact of
the pipeline embargo.7 8 The results of the study were welcomed by
many Europeans who saw them as a presage of a change of mind
72. Morris, supra note 71, at 23.
73. Id.
74. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1983, at D9, col. 1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade is the primary forum for trade agreements and negotiations between the United
States and Western Europe.
75. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1983, at 45, col. 1.
76. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1983, at D2, col. 5.
77. Wash. Post, Apr. 21, 1983, at Dll, col. 5.
78. OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 72.
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by Congress as to the wisdom of extraterritorial use of the EAA.7e
The OTA report contained a thorough study of the history and
application of the EAA and an excellent analysis of the political
and economic results of Presidential imposition of export controls
under the Carter and Reagan administrations. The gist of the
study was that the attempts to hurt the Soviet economy through
grain and equipment embargoes were largely ineffective. 0 In refer-
ence to United States-European disputes over the pipeline em-
bargo, the report stated, "In the short term, alliance relations ap-
pear to have been damaged while the U.S.S.R. seems little
affected." 81 Long-term effects were difficult to predict, but the dif-
ference in viewpoints between the United States and the Europe-
ans on trade with the Soviet Union seemed unlikely to change.
2. The House of Representatives
The report from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs of its
proposed amendments to the EAA was published in July 1983.82
The report contained a preamble which showed the concern among
legislators with the use of executive discretion in imposing foreign
policy controls:
The committee's review of the implementation of the Export
Administrative [sic] Act over the past 4 years, and the impact of
the act upon U.S. export trade, leads to the conclusion that ac-
tions taken under the act, particularly for the purposes of fur-
thering U.S. foreign policy goals, may be the single greatest hin-
drance to U.S. exports, costing significant loss of U.S. jobs.
Although imposed for good and even noble purposes, . . . these
controls have created a pervasive belief in world markets that
U.S. firms cannot be relied upon as suppliers particularly for
larger projects which require long-term servicing, spare parts, and
the like.
This crisis of confidence in the reliablility of U.S. suppliers has
not been confined to products and projects that have actually
been disrupted by the imposition of U.S. foreign policy export
controls, but by extension to virtually all U.S. products. It has
79. See, e.g., Congress plays Europe's tune, ECONOMIST, May 14, 1983, at 65.
80. OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 8. "Although both embargoes were directed at vulner-
able areas of the Soviet economy, their results were inconclusive at best. U.S. sanctions and
embargoes may well have hurt the U.S.S.R., but it is unlikely that they have hurt enough to
make a real economic difference." Id.
81. Id. at 72.
82. H.R. REP. No. 257, part 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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been fueled by the reactions of foreign governments, business ex-
ecutives, and workers who have resented the imposition of these
controls extraterritorially upon products previously exported
from the United States and firms affiliated with U.S. companies
but located abroad and regarded as subject primarily to foreign
laws. No other country attempts to impose export controls extra-
territorially to the extent that the United States does. .... 83
The primary concern of the committee was the effect of the execu-
tive actions on United States business and trade. The committee
also recognized, however, the force of the foreign arguments as to
the questionable nature of extraterritorial application of the pipe-
line sanctions, and made a somewhat surprising admission in the
statement that the United States attempts to extend controls ex-
traterritorially more than other countries.8 " The bottom line, how-
ever, was obviously American jobs and American business. The
preamble went on to state: "The loss resulting from the controls on
the export of gas transmission equipment for the Yamal pipeline
alone was estimated to exceed $850 million in export sales and a
minimum of 25,000 jobs. The indirect costs of such controls are
probably at least as great as the direct effects.""'
Congruent with this protrade, anticontrol attitude, the commit-
tee made several changes to the Act. The provisions proposed by
the administration to strengthen the President's ability to control
foreign availability were not included, and several provisions mak-
ing it easier to remove export controls on the basis of foreign avail-
ability were added.86 The power of the President to impose foreign
policy controls extraterritorially was removed,87 except with the ex-
press authorization of Congress by law.s Existing contracts were
83. Id. at 6-7.
84. Cf. Dam, supra note 58, at 49 (discussion of extraterritorial applications of law by
other countries); also, Secretary of State Schultz's rather defensive statement in the context
of the pipeline controversy, "Nobody wants us to interfere in their internal affairs. But as is
traditional, everybody interferes in ours." N.Y. Times, May 28, 1983, at 45, col. 5.
85. H.R. REP. No. 257, part 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1983).
86. Id. at 18-19.
87. Id. at 48. The committee removed the language in the authority-granting paragraph
of § 6 which referred to goods or persons "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
The new language in subsection (a) limits the President's control over "exportation from
the United States of any goods, technology, or other information produced in the United
States .. " (emphasis added). (This language affects the President's authority over reex-
ports, since only goods actually leaving the United States could be affected.)
88. The new subsection (n) requires Congress to grant specific authority to the President
if he determines that controls should be imposed outside of the authority granted in subsec-
tion (a). These extraordinary controls may be imposed "only if a law is enacted authorizing
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made immune to controls except in certain extraordinary circum-
stances." A separate requirement for consultation with other coun-
tries was added,90 and the necessity for consideration of foreign
availability emphasized.' 1 The President would be required to con-
sult with and report to Congress before imposing, expanding or ex-
tending any export controls.2 In addition, the authority to restrict
imports from countries violating controls, as requested by the
President, was not included in the committee's bill.93
3. The Senate
The Senate, however, was not as responsive to the European de-
mands for curbs on extraterritoriality and retroactive application
to existing contracts. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs consolidated the various proposals for amend-
ments to the EAA.9' The changes to the foreign policy sections
were few. The amendments to section 6(a) gave the President the
authority he requested to restrict imports from a sanctioned coun-
try." The amendments deleted the Presidential power to interrupt
existing contracts, but amended the International Emergency Eco-
nomics Powers Act (IEEPA) to grant such power.' The committee
realized that the inclusion in the IEEPA of the power to break
contracts in the national interest "implies a somewhat broader
concept of 'emergency' than may heretofore have been the case.
the imposition of those controls." H.R. REP. No. 257, part 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1983).
Discussing the constitutionality of this provision after Immigration & Naturalization
Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto), the House Com-
mittee on Rules concluded that requiring an affirmative enactment of law is constitutional.
H.R. REP. No. 257, part 3, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. (1983).
89. The new provision allows retroactive controls if they "relate directly, immediately,
and significantly to actual or imminent acts of aggression or of international terrorism, ...
human rights ... or nuclear weapons tests." H.R. REP. No. 257, part 1, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 54 (1983). The caveat raises the question of how effective the restraint will be on
Presidential action. Presumably the grain embargo, in response to the invasion of Afghani-
stan, and the pipeline embargo, in response to martial law in Poland, could be applied retro-
actively under this caveat. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a situation in which the President
might attempt to apply retroactive controls which would not be in reaction to one of these
exceptional circumstances.
90. Id. § 6(d) at 50.
91. Id. § 6(b)(7) at 50.
92. Id. § 6(f) at 51.
93. See discussion id. at 79 (Additional Views of Hon. Olympia J. Snowe).
94. S. REP. No. 170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
95. Id. at 48.
96. Id. at 79.
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The Committee accepts that implication. . . ."s Thus the amend-
ments had no effect on the executive power to apply export con-
trols retroactively.
Another provision deemed important by the committee was the
language change in section (b). This section sets out the criteria to
be considered by the President prior to imposing controls. The new
language replaces "consider" with "determine," deletes old crite-
rion 6, and adds, rather ineffectively, "such controls will not have
an extraterritorial effect on countries friendly to the United States
adverse to overall United States foreign policy interest."98 The
committee felt that the word "determine" would have more of a
"binding" effect on the President. The amendments also require
the President to submit a report to Congress before the controls
could take effect."
4. Analysis
The Senate committee, while somewhat sensitive to the
problems, was not as receptive to the protests and demands of the
United States subsidiaries and European organization. The pro-
posed Senate amendments retained the presidential authority to
impose controls extraterritorially or retroactively and strengthened
presidential power and discretion by giving him import restriction
authority. On the other hand, the proposed amendments from the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs took into consideration the
primary concerns of both United States and foreign critics. The
interruption of existing contracts was of great concern as it drasti-
cally affected the perceived reliability of United States suppliers
on the world market 00 and encouraged foreign importers to seek
alternative suppliers. 10' Although it does not comfort companies in
the process of bidding on contracts whose future possibilities could
be abruptly curtailed, the House provision may allow companies to
fulfill prior commitments, if the rule is not swallowed by the ex-
ception for extraordinary circumstances.
97. Id. at 24.
98. Id. at 49.
99. Id. at 50.
100. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. See also OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at
59.
101. See OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 4. The Soviet Union "seems to have succeeded
in replacing the United States as its principal agricultural supplier." See also id. at 58.
Caterpillar Inc. claims that before the first oil and gas equipment controls in 1978, it had
85% of the Soviet Union market. Now it claims only 15% while a Japanese firm takes care
of the other 85%.
1984]
92 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:73
The House bill also addressed the foreign concern with extrater-
ritoriality, although again only partially comforting the critics.
Controls might still be applied beyond the United States borders,
but only with the express consent of Congress. The practical possi-
bility of such controls being approved after consideration in a leg-
islature listening to the protest of corporations at home and abroad
seems remote. 10 2 Thus, the House committee, at any rate, was ap-
parently "playing Europe's tune."'03
VI. RESIDUE OF BITTERNESS
This comment has examined the reactions, protests, and de-
mands of foreign governments after the imposition of the oil and
gas equipment export controls in 1982 and the response, or lack
thereof, by the American side. Consideration of the legal argu-
ments of both domestic and international scope is important and
must underlie any action taken by Congress in redrafting the EAA
and any consideration by the executive branch of future controls.
Much of the pressure brought to bear in the final resolution of
these problems, however, arises in the political and economic
spheres, °H which are beyond the scope of this comment. The pipe-
line embargo and the increased tension between the United States
and the Soviet Union have left the Western world sharply focused
on the need for cooperation in both of these spheres. In the politi-
cal sphere, some authorities in the United States have become
aware that the United States can no longer act unilaterally and
expect the rest of the world to follow.105 American technology is no
longer so unique that it possesses the leverage in the world market
that it once did.'" The suggestion has been made, and underlined
102. Under the House provisions, Congress would have up to 60 days to pass a law au-
thorizing the controls. Section 6(n)(1). H.R. REP. No. 257, part 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 54
(1983).
103. Congress plays Europe's tune, ECONOMIST, May 14, 1983, at 65.
104. OTA REPORT, supra note 6, gives an excellent analysis of the embargo and its polit-
ical and economic ramifications.
105. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 6, at 88:
It is time for the United States to step down from its position as "leader of the
free world," and to step into a position of joint leadership with such other nations
as West Germany, Japan, France, and England.... Unfortunately or fortunately,
the United States is no longer in a position to make unilaterial decisions and then
to seek the backing of its allies.
106. See Remarks By Edward L. Goldman, 74 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 94 (1980). In
relation to export controls and licensing, Mr. Goldman said: "Much of the licensing process
demonstrates the lack of awareness that the United States is no longer in a technologically
leading position. . . . Admittedly, there may be a few areas where the United States still
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by the European protest, that the United States must take its
place as an equal member of an allied group of nations, conscious
of the need for consultation and cooperation." 7
In the economic sphere, the growing number and unique needs
of multinational corporations necessitate a quick and peaceful res-
olution to the problems of jurisdiction and government control.
The plight of multinationals stretched between conflicting asser-
tions of control and prohibition was dramatically illustrated by the
pipeline controversy. 10 8 Now accusations of extraterritoriality are
being made by United States corporations toward new EEC pro-
posals concerning labor laws.109 In the future the governments on
both sides of the Atlantic should recognize the necessity for clear
equitable rules of international jurisdiction and control if business
corporations are to continue to thrive.
The passing of the pipeline controversy has left a "residue of
bitterness" in its wake.110 The pipeline embargo, added to past ac-
tions of presidents in controlling exports, has spawned a wariness
of United States "jerkiness" in foreign policy implementation,"'
with resulting daipage to the United States' image for dependabil-
ity-economically, politically, 2 and legally. Whatever solution is
worked out by the United States Congress and the executive
branch in dealing with the possibility of future embargo situations,
any action should be taken with an awareness of foreign concerns
and expectations and a respect for the legal implications, as well as
the political and economic effects, of such action.
holds the lead, .... but the United States is not the leader by much." See also Berman,
supra note 6, at 86.
107. See supra note 105.
108. See, e.g., Between Reagan and a hard place, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 1982, at 55; Eu-
rope drives a hole through those American sanctions, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 1982, at 47. See
also OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 58.
109. A Turnabout In Extraterritoriality, 76 Am. J. INT'L L. 591 (1982).
110. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1983, at 45, col. 4.
111. Rows do make people think, ECONOMisT, Nov. 20, 1982, at 11. "For America's presi-
dent has also behaved so jerkily over the pipeline as to lose the confidence of France, and to
a lesser extent of West Germany, Britain, and Italy." Id.
112. See, e.g., OTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 7:
In this case the U.S. Government's evaluation of what is best for West European
security differs from that of the West Europeans themselves. Should the United
States use its foreign policy controls [on exports] to the U.S.S.R. as much to in-
convenience and modify the policies of its allies as to inconvenience or exact con-
cessions from the Soviet Union?
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